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INTRODUCTION
The rapid economic modernization of the People's Republic of
China (China) since reforms began in 1978 has led to unprecedented
economic growth rates and unparalleled environmental destruction.'
Today, by the standards of the World Health Organization, six out of
the ten most polluted cities in the world are in China.2 China's challenge
to develop a fiscal and regulatory formula for "sustainable develop-
ment" 3 necessitates a responsible, long-term balance between economic
growth and environmental protection.4 Broadly stated, this dilemma
resembles the problems faced in many other developing countries except
in one crucial respect: the sheer enormity of China's current and future
environmental problems in terms of the danger to public health and the
degradation of the natural ecosystem.' China's population size and popu-
lation growth,6 coupled with its economic growth rates, may cause an
1. Since 1980, economic growth in China has averaged 9-10 percent a year, reaching
13.4 percent in 1993. See Marcus W. Brauchli, Cost of Growth: China's Environment is
Severely Stressed as Its Industry Surges, WALL ST. J., July 25, 1994, at Al. China's economy
is now recognized as the second or third largest in the world. Id.
2. Sheila Tefft, Rush to Burn Coal Turns China Into Asia's Polluter, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Aug. 30, 1995, at 1.
3. The World Commission on Environment and Development defines the term as
follows:
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It
contains within it two key concepts:
- the concept of 'needs', in particular the essential needs of the world's poor,
to which overriding priority should be given; and
- the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social
organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs.
WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987).
There appears, however, to be no consensus in the aftermath of the 1992 United Nations
Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) on a definition of "sustainable
development." David A. Wirth, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: Two
Steps Forward and One Back, or Vice Versa?, 29 GA. L. REV. 599, 607 n.24 (1995).
4. But see JIM ROHWER, ASIA RISING 14 (1995) ("Once countries become very rich, their
demand for commodities starts growing more slowly and, for some commodities, eventually
goes into an absolute decline (which is why environmentalists should, though almost none do,
campaign for the fastest economic growth possible)").
5. According to one Western diplomat in Beijing, "China is a looming environmental
catastrophe. It will make Eastern Europe look like a nature park." David Lague, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Feb. 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, SChina File.
6. Garett Hardin's classic article The Tragedy of the Commons, persuasively presented
the nexus between population density and pollution. Garett Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968). In the most comprehensive evaluation of China's environ-
mental quality to date, several scientists have concluded that the high population growth rate
is a primary cause of the degradation of China's environment. Fu LIXUE ET AL., GAISHAN
SHENGTAI HUANJING [Improving the Environment] 215 (1989), cited in VACLAV SMIL,
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environmental catastrophe unseen in history.7
The electrical power sector is one of the leading contributors to this
environmental crisis. Driven by surging demand for energy which has
far exceeded supply in recent years, the Chinese government currently
seeks to expand the country's energy production capacity to the point of
meeting the needs of 1.2 billion people and an increasing number of
industrial facilities. Though power generation is an indispensable com-
ponent of China's economic growth, unrestrained development will lead
to dire environmental consequences for China and, eventually, the
world.
This Note proposes a strategy to mitigate the environmental degra-
dation resulting from China's power development. Part I introduces
China's power industry - its excessive dependence on coal, its anti-
quated and inefficient infrastructure, its pollutive effects, and its project-
ed expansion. Part II appraises the ways in which China's environmental
laws, macroeconomic controls, and foreign investment restrictions
influence the growth of power development and its corresponding effect
on the environment. Part III assesses the role that governments, develop-
ment banks, and international organizations can play in curbing the
environmental impact of Chinese power projects. Considering the prob-
lems associated with current Chinese and international pollution-control
efforts established in Parts II and III, Part IV proposes a comprehensive
strategy to control the environmental excesses caused by power develop-
ment.
This Note concludes that China should liberalize its project finance
regulations in the power sector to allow international sources of private
capital and technology to both develop the power infrastructure and its
associated pollution-control technologies. Further, Beijing should aggres-
sively reform its commodity-price system notwithstanding current feder-
alism and economic constraints. On the international front, this Note
posits that international organizations such as the World Bank should
continue to use loans and grants as leverage to pressure China for
environmental improvements. Developed countries, however, should
press China for environmental changes only as vigorously as they
pursue their own levels of wasteful energy consumption and pollution.
CHINA'S ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 11 n.25 (1993) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS].
7. See Brauchli, supra note 1, at Al.
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I. ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN CHINA
A. The Environmental Impact of Chinese Energy Consumption
Air pollution levels 9 underscore the severity of environmental degra-
dation in China and the urgency with which the problem must be
addressed. China's energy consumption patterns have led to average
concentrations of suspended particulate matter which exceed recom-
mended safe levels by up to six times' ° and average sulfur dioxide (SO2)
concentrations which are two times the recommended amounts." Incom-
plete combustion of coal also generates large amounts of airborne
carcinogens.12
This severe air pollution has exacted a tremendous toll on public
health. According to a World Bank environmental strategy paper, respi-
ratory disease linked to pollution is the leading cause of death in
China. 3 One study revealed that breathing the air in Beijing for one day
is equivalent to smoking three packs of unfiltered cigarettes. 4 In fact, in
China's large cities, high concentrations of particulate matter, carcino-
gens, and SO 2 have contributed to heightened respiratory, cardiac, and
8. China's energy economy consists of two parts: the traditional-fuel economy for rural
peasants, mainly in the form of wood; and the processed-fuel economy for city dwellers and
for Chinese industry. This Note focuses on the latter type.
9. Though energy production affects the environment in a variety of ways including
water and land-use problems, this Note focuses on air pollution, the area to which there has
been the most attention on both domestic and international fronts. See generally ENVIRON-
MENTAL CRISIS, supra note 6, at 99-137 (assessing water, land use, and air pollution issues
connected with energy use in China); VACLAV SMIL, ENERGY IN CHINA'S MODERNIZATION
214-24 (1988) (examining the wide-ranging environmental effects of energy consumption)
[hereinafter ENERGY].
10. Suspended particulate concentrations average 526 pg/m3 in northern China and 318
pig/m3 in the south. The World Health Organization (WHO) recommends a ceiling of 60-90
pglm3. Lague, supra note 5.
11. Sulfur dioxide concentrations average 93 pg/m3 in the north and 119 lag/m3 in the
south, surpassing the WHO guideline level of 40-60 pg/m3. Id. During the worst days the
most polluted areas can reach 2000 pg/m3 compared with typical winter levels of 20-100
Vg/m3 in North American cities. ENVIRONMENTAL Ciusis, supra note 6, at 117.
12. ENERGY, supra note 9, at 217. The concentrations of benzo(a)-pyrene, a polycyclic
aromatic hydrocarbon, reach as high as 5-10 pg/100 m3 in northern cities with peaks in
industrial cities exceeding 20 pg/100 m3. Id.
13. Lague, supra note 5. In the city of Benxi, the death rate from lung cancer has
doubled in recent years and in several of its townships, health standards have declined to the
point that young men cannot qualify for recruitment into the Chinese Army. Daniel
Southerland, China's Industrial Pollution Posing Severe Health Hazards; Economic Priorities,
Limited Funds Help Create Ecological Monster, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1990, at A18.
14. Rone Tempest, Is Pollution the Price of Asia's Development?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29,
1994, at H9.
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cancer morbidity and mortality.' 5 The air pollution is also causing acid
precipitation, 6 which increases the acidity and changes the species
composition of vulnerable lakes, endangers the growth of coniferous
forests, 7 and blackens crops throughout agricultural regions.' 8 Given the
immense strain on China's environment, serious repercussions - in
lives and in yuan - will accompany current power development plans
unless appropriate measures are taken.
Two factors, China's excessive dependence on coal and the coun-
try's antiquated industrial infrastructure, are primarily responsible for the
environmental dilemma resulting from Chinese energy consumption.
China is among a minority of countries endowed with energy resources
so as to be virtually self-sufficient in supplying all of its domestic
energy needs.' Currently, the primary fuel used in the country is high-
sulfur coal;2' it is in abundance, of a high quality, and readily minable.2
Indeed, as the world's third largest producer and consumer of energy,22
China is also the world's largest producer of raw coal,23 with present
consumption at approximately 1.2 billion tons and projected to rise to
1.6 billion tons early in the next century.24 Earlier this century, devel-
oped countries such as the United States and Great Britain switched
from untreated coal to cleaner-burning sources of fuel. China, however,
has only recently embarked on its industrialization. This disproportionate
15. ENERGY, supra note 9, at 217. Cancer mortality is four to six times higher in urban
areas than in rural areas. Id.
16. The rainy eastern and the southwestern portions of China are particularly affected,
with pH values as low as 4.0 in the Southwest. Id.
17. Id.
18. Tempest, supra note 14, at H9. Japan and South Korea are increasingly concerned
with transboundary air pollution and acid rain. Id.
19. ENERGY, supra note 9, at 8. See also Zhou Dadi, Environmental Considerations in
the Economic Development of China, 9 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 221, 225 (1992). A huge
population reduces the large totals to much more modest per capita figures. ENERGY, supra
note 9, at 8.
20. Three-quarters of China's energy is derived from the combustion of coal. ENVIRON-
MENTAL CRISIS, supra note 6, at 117.
There is uncertainty regarding the magnitude of China's hydrocarbon reserves (oil and
natural gas). ENERGY, supra note 9, at 40. In 1990, China produced 138 million tons of crude
oil. China Stepping Up Foreign E&P Investment as Oil Imports Soar, OIL & GAS J., May 9,
1994, at 56, 57. China has, in recent years and in the face of surging demand, increased its
oil imports and was projected to become a net oil importer by late 1994. Id. at 56.
21. ENERGY, supra note 9, at 31-33.
22. ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS, supra note 6, at 100.
23. Id. at 112.
24. Yang Chun-Xi et al., China's Treatment of Crimes Against the Environment: Using
Criminal Sanctions to Fight Environmental Degradation in the PRC, 8 J. CHINESE L. 145,
146 (1994).
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use of coal, inevitably a long-term reliance,' has particularly grave
environmental consequences as coal is one of the most environmentally
damaging sources of fuel.26
The second factor contributing to China's environmental degradation
is an outdated industrial infrastructure which inefficiently converts
power, thereby wasting massive amounts of energy and exacerbating the
pollutive effects of coal. Industry is, in fact, the primary consumer of
China's energy output. In 1990, approximately two-thirds of commercial
energy fueled industry, while only one quarter of all fuels were utilized
by China's more than 200 million households.27 Inefficiency also
plagues China's energy convertors in all other sectors, from residential
heating units and household coal stoves to industrial boilers and steam
locomotives.2 8 As a result of these inefficiencies, the amount of energy
consumed in producing Chinese goods and services is much higher than
in Western countries. 29 For instance, "[tihe energy required to produce
$100 million in national income is more than 2.5 times higher than in
25. Patrick E. Tyler, China's Inevitable Dilemma: Coal Equals Growth, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 1995, at Al [hereinafter Coal Equals Growth]. According to China's Environmental
Protection Bureau chief Song Dian Tang, "China will have to use coal as its principal source
of energy for the next 100 years." Uli Schmetzer, In China, Pollution Can Turn Snowflakes
Black, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 3, 1994, at 1.
26. See Coal Equals Growth, supra note 25, at Al. In recognition of the severe urban
pollution caused by the excessive use of coal, China has recently launched an effort to expand
its use of natural gas with a $1 billion investment in a gas industry development program. See
Thomas Land, Pollution Causes Subtle Shift from Coal to Gas, GAS WORLD INT'L, Aug.
1994, at 14. China's oil refining industry has also embarked on a massive overhaul and
expansion to accommodate soaring domestic demand. China seeks to increase its current
refining capacity of 3.2 million barrels/day to 4.6 million barrels/day by the year 2000.
China's Refiners Face Massive Overhaul, Expansion to Meet Demand Growth, New Crude
Slate, OIL & GAS J., May 9, 1994, at 36.
27. ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS, supra note 6, at 111. Chinese residential users also primari-
ly bum untreated coal for their cooking and heating needs and use considerably less electrici-
ty, liquid and gaseous fuels compared to residential consumers in developed nations. Dadi,
supra note 19, at 227.
28. ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS, supra note 6, at 124. Such inefficiencies result from:
a combination of outdated technologies (the bulk of China's heavy industrial
capacity is still either of the 1950s' vintage or derived from those outmoded
designs), widespread poor maintenance (a chronic weakness in all centrally run
economies whose bureaucracies are much better at pushing through construction of
large projects than assuring their continuous efficient operation), heavy reliance on
coal, and lack of incentives to boost the performance of energy convertors (a direct
consequence of China's irrational price system).
Id. The Energy Research Institute in Beijing suggests that the installation of more efficient
industrial boilers and furnaces could reduce energy consumption levels by as much as 50
percent. Tefft, supra note 2, at 8.
29. ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS, supra note 6, at 124. For example, China is not as efficient
as other nations in converting raw fuel inputs into usable energy sources. Id. at 123.
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the United States, and nearly six times greater than in Japan or
France.'30 These wasteful energy consumption patterns intensify the use
of coal and place tremendous strain on the natural ecosystem in China.
B. Future Energy Needs
The development of a modern electrical power system is indispens-
able to sustain economic growth and political stability in China.31 Cur-
rently, China's power plants are ill-equipped to handle the country's de-
mand for energy services.32 China's electricity production continues to
lag about 20 percent behind demand,33 and power shortages have already
held back industrial output by 20-40 percent?4 These shortages, coupled
with Beijing's ambitious drive to quadruple economic output between
1980 and 2000, have caused energy demands to surge. By the year
2000, China hopes to double its electric power generation.35
As China's mounting environmental problems continue to exact a
heavy toll on public health and, increasingly, economic output, the
Chinese economy desperately needs further growth before it can afford
to replace coal with cleaner-burning fuels and to implement more ad-
vanced environmental controls. Yet power development is a Catch-22:
raising the capital needed for more comprehensive environmental protec-
tion depends on expanded power generating capabilities, but developing
the power infrastructure only generates more pollution. The next two
Parts assess the efforts of the Chinese government and the international
community to deal with China's energy/environment dilemma and to
develop proposals based on the shortcomings of present measures.
30. Joseph R. Profaizer, Note, Economic Development and Environmental Law in
China's Special Economic Zones, 28 TEX. INT'L L.J. 319, 327 (1993).
31. Patrick E. Tyler, China's Power Needs Exceed Investor Tolerance, N.Y. TImEs, Nov.
7, 1994, at C7 [hereinafter China's Power Needs].
32. For example, unlike developed nations whose energy consumption rose an average of
28 percent between 1970 and 1990, China's energy consumption rose 208 percent during the
same period. Coal Equals Growth, supra note 25, at A8.
33. China's Power Needs, supra note 31, at B19.
34. Kimbrely Wilhelm, China's Energy Crisis: More Resources Needed to Power
Economic Growth, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 17, 1994, at El.
35. Tempest, supra note 14, at 9. China's Ministry of Power projects that China will
need to install 15,000 to 17,000 megawatts of generating plant each year for more than a
decade - the equivalent of each year duplicating all of Southern California Edison's plants,
which supply Southern and Central California. China's Power Needs, supra note 31, at B13.
Eighty percent of the electric power is expected to be met by coal. Tempest, supra note 14, at
9.
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II. CHINESE REGULATORY MEASURES
The severity of current air pollution levels and the potential for
immense future harm have elevated environmental protection efforts to
a top-level national priority in China.36 In March 1994, China's State
Council sent a clear signal of the country's stronger commitment to the
environment when it approved China's Agenda 21, the White Paper on
Population, Environment, and Development in the 21st Century, drafted
in accordance with recommendations developed at the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED).37 UNCED's
Agenda 21 was developed as an action plan for governments to join
together "in a global partnership for sustainable development" to be
"carried out by the various actors according to the different situations,
capacities and priorities of countries and regions."38 While Agenda 21
largely reflects policies currently in place, the plan's release has "shifted
the center of gravity in the environment/development debate further in
the direction of environmental protection. " 9 The following Section
examines the various regulations that impede China's ability to mitigate
the pollutive effects of power development. This Section demonstrates
that the most promising short-term reform initiative does not directly
concern the environmental protection regime, but rather China's regula-
tion of foreign investment.
A. Environmental Law
When the National People's Congress convened on December 4,
1982, it adopted a constitution which embodied the groundwork for
fairly extensive environmental protection legislation. 4° Article 9 estab-
lishes the State's duty to conserve natural resources and wildlife, and
Article 10 establishes the duty of persons and organizations to ensure
rational land use.41 Article 26 establishes the State's duty to protect and
36. Brauchli, supra note 1, at Al.
37. Lester Ross, The Next Wave of Environmental Legislation, CHINA Bus. REV., July
1994, at 30-32. See infra text accompanying notes 126-28.
38. Adoption of Agreements on Environment and Development, U.N. Conference on
Environment and Development, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 21, at 4, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.151/4 (1992).
39. Ross, supra note 37, at 31. Statements in March 1994 by Fan Weitang, Vice-Minister
of the Ministry of Coal Industry (which has traditionally opposed stronger air pollution
controls) indicate that the Ministry now stresses the importance of balancing the costs of
cleaner technology and the benefits of environmental protection with the need to promote
industrial development. lit
40. P.R.C. CoNsT. (1982).
41. Id. arts. 9-10.
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improve the environment and preserve forests.42 China enacted an array
of measures based on these constitutional provisions that centered
around the Environmental Protection Law drafted for trial implementa-
tion in 1979 and later enacted in 1984 and 1989. 43 In a relatively short
time, China's regulatory regime has been able to achieve significant suc-
cesses. 44 Regulatory agencies now employ over 80,000 personnel 45 and
have adopted new methods for implementing environmental legislation.4
1. China's Pollution Penalty System
At the heart of China's environmental law is a series of fees and
fines which are triggered when polluters exceed threshold levels of
pollution ("National Emission Norms") set by the National Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (NEPA).47 Such economic measures have curbed
ecological degradation in some of China's worst-polluted regions.48 The
system has also provided a network to monitor emissions and a staff
trained in environmental management. 49 By late 1994, more than $2.3
billion had been collected,5" and the funds had gone to finance pollution
control equipment and educating and training administrators.5' Within
this environmental protection framework, NEPA has specifically recog-
nized the severe pollutive effects of power generation by targeting the
power sector. In addition, Beijing and NEPA are considering new envi-
42. Id. art. 26.
43. Ross, supra note 37, at 30. The State Council, National Environmental Protection
Agency, and various ministries have promulgated additional regulations. In addition, several
ministries have issued over 300 environmental standards. Id.
44. However, while a 1992 World Bank report gave China high marks for developing
and enforcing environmental laws, the report stated that any achievements have been seriously
undermined by "insufficient funding, lax monitoring, the subservience of regulatory efforts to
industrial development, and the inefficient use of raw materials and energy due to their
heavily subsidized prices." Robert Benjamin, World Bank Assails China On Environment,
BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 19, 1992, at IA.
45. Ross, supra note 37, at 31.
46. Id.
47. Article 18 of China's Environmental Protection Law provides that wherever discharg-
es of pollutants exceed state limits, a fine will be levied. Environmental Protection Law of the
P.R.C., art. 18, cited in Wang Xi & Robert F. Blomquist, The Developing Environmental Law
and Policy of the People's Republic of China: An Introduction and Appraisal, 5 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 25, 46 n.115 (1992).
48. Michael Potier, China Charges for Pollution, 192 OECD OBSERVER 18, 22 (1995).
49. Id. at 20.
50. Agnes Shanley, China Sets a New Agenda: The Environment is Now a Top Priority,
CHEMICAL ENGINEERING, Apr., 1995, at 30.
51. Potier, supra note 48, at 20. See also Shanley, supra note 50, at 30 ("Of the money
collected, 80% goes into a regional fund, from which local companies can borrow to buy
pollution control equipment. The other 20% goes to environmental agencies to help defray
monitoring and enforcement costs.").
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ronmental control requirements for power plant smokestacks. 52
2. Environmental Impact Assessments
Besides fines, the other components of China's environmental law
have played a relatively inconsequential role in terms of total pollution
abatement. Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), which require
investors to submit reports on the environmental consequences of their
projects, represent such a futile attempt.53 Yet, official approvals for
such projects usually precede the submission of the ElAs. 4 As a result,
EIAs have developed into pro forma procedures rather than effective
environmental planning controls." The futility of environmental assess-
ments in practice is one manifestation of a recurring theme in Chinese
policy - environmental protection takes a back seat to the economic
priorities of development.
3. Judicial Proceedings
The Chinese judiciary has also been used to enforce environmental
law through civil and criminal actions. While the use of the judiciary
holds promise for the future as China's legal system continues to devel-
op, litigation is inherently constrained by the institutional weaknesses of
Chinese courts. According to one expert, an array of factors contribute
to the weakness of China's judiciary:
First, judges may simply lack the education necessary to do the job
competently. Second, even if judges have enough education to do
the job, they may be corrupt or partial and unwilling to render a
correct judgment. Third, even if judges are able and willing to
render a correct judgment, their decision may be overridden by
higher authorities within the court. Fourth, the court as a whole -
not just the individual judges who hear cases - is subject to
numerous outside pressures and is particularly vulnerable to local
government direction. Fifth, any judgment needs to be enforced,
52. Ross, supra note 37, at 33.
53. See Profaizer, supra note 30, at 336.
54. Id.
55. China: A Matter of Priorities, FAR. E. EcON. REv., Nov. 16, 1995, at 70. One
American developer in China notes, for instance, that while investors must submit an EIA
before beginning a project, companies can often go ahead with projects without implementing
recommended mitigation procedures. Id.
1024 [Vol. 17:1015
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16yet the courts are short on autonomous enforcement powers.
These factors, coupled with specific weaknesses of the criminal and civil
laws, have rendered judicial enforcement ineffective. Nonetheless, it is
worth examining the current state of civil and criminal law in order to
assess their feasibility as tools for environmental enforcement in the
future.
The use of civil liability emerged in 1985 with the ground-breaking
case in the Shenzhen Special Zone involving Kaida Enterprises, Ltd.
(Kaida).57 In that case, the Shenzhen monitoring station acted on the
complaints of local citizens by suing Kaida, a wholly-owned Hong Kong
enterprise operating in Shenzhen.5 8 The court held Kaida liable for
pollution, assessed a nominal fine and ordered conformity with "relevant
state standards and regulations. ''59 Though the case represented a first
step toward holding polluters responsible (the "polluter pays principle"),
it was also a very rare instance in which the Chinese judiciary enforced
environmental standards.6° This is reflected by the paucity of such cases
in the aftermath of Kaida.
61
Chinese officials have also attempted to use criminal laws to enforce
environmental laws. 62 The wording and statutory construction of the
56. Donald C. Clarke, What's Law Got to Do With It? Legal Institutions and Economic
Reform in China, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 57-58 (1991). See generally Matt Fomey,
Don't Hold Your Breath. Will the Legal System Ever Be Free of Party Influence?, FAR. E.
ECON. REV., Mar. 7, 1996, at 24 (discussing the difficulty of ending party control of the court
system).
57. See LESTER Ross & MITCHELL A. SILK, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 258 (1987).
58. Id. at 259.
59. Id. at 260.
60. See generally Profaizer, supra note 30, at 337-41.
61. Id. at 341.
62. See Ross & SILK, supra note 57, at 250 (detailing a 1979 criminal case against a
warehouse worker in Suzhou). The pertinent articles of China's Criminal Law are as follows:
Article 115. Whoever violates the regulations on the control of articles of an
explosive, combustible, radioactive, poisonous or corrosive nature, giving rise to a
major accident in the course of production, storage, transportation or use and
causing serious consequences, is to be sentenced to not more than three years of
fixed-term imprisonment or criminal detention; when the consequences are espe-
cially serious, the sentence is to be not less than three years and not more than
seven years of fixed-term imprisonment.
Article 187. State personnel who, because of neglect of duty, cause public
property or the interest of the state and the people to suffer major losses are to be
sentenced to not more than five years of fixed-term imprisonment.
The Criminal Law of the P.R.C., arts. 87 & 115, cited in Chun-Xi et al., supra note 24, at
155-56 [hereinafter "Criminal Law"].
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Criminal Law have, however, limited its effectiveness at curbing large
quantities of pollutive emissions. First, the lack of a specific criminal
provision for environmental pollution causes application of criminal
liability to be disorganized because it forces reliance on both the envi-
ronmental statute and the relevant provisions of the Criminal Law.63
Further, "the law's lack of specific penalties and provisions for environ-
mental offenses makes criminal justice agencies reluctant to prosecute
cases in which environmental harm has occurred as a by-product of
otherwise lawful economic activity." 64 Finally, the most significant
hurdle to the efficacious use of the Criminal Law is its limited class of
defendants. The definition of juridical persons in the Criminal Law is
currently not interpreted to include corporate entities - oftentimes the
worst environmental offenders.65 In the final analysis, the
effectiveness of such [criminal] sanctions, both now and in the
future, might depend in large measure on their role as additional
weapons in the government's environmental protection arsenal -
more persuasive by their mere presence than by their use, more
valuable as additional means of exhortation than as grounds for
prosecution.66
B. Fundamental Shortcomings of Polluter Liability System
Given the relative successes of environmental enforcement through
fees and fines compared to environmental impact assessments and
judicial proceedings, this Section more closely examines polluter liabili-
ty - the core component of China's environmental regulation. This
Section concludes that the results of China's polluter liability system are
incongruent with the seemingly strict and comprehensive nature of
Chinese environmental laws. This results from a variety of institutional
problems, the most important of which - federalism - reaches far be-
yond the scope of pollution in China and poses one of the most signifi-
cant administrative challenges to the Chinese government in the coming
decades.
There are two statutory shortcomings of China's economic sanctions
for pollution. First outdated laws create gaps and ambiguities. For
example, some laws are still framed in terms of the State plan and can,
63. Chun-Xi et al., supra note 24, at 182-83; Ross, supra note 37, at 31.
64. Ross, supra note 37, at 31.
65. Chun-Xi et al., supra note 24, at 164.
66. I41 at 181.
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therefore, be interpreted to apply only to government work units.67 This
leaves regulators and entrepreneurs uncertain whether certain laws apply
to non-State enterprises or private businesses. 68 Further, state-run pollut-
ers, some of the worst offenders, rarely face strict enforcement action.69
Second, the current system does not provide adequate incentives to
reduce emissions because it permits a great disparity between the mar-
ginal amount of the fees and the marginal costs of implementing pollu-
tion control measures.70 These factors lead most firms to pay the fees
rather than invest in emission controls. 7' As one commentator observes:
The system does not encourage enterprises to improve on the stan-
dards set. They pay charges only for the worst-offending pollutant
and not for the other pollutants they discharge. Having complied
with the law, they have no inducement to curb emissions of other
pollutants, not even when the marginal cost of reducing emissions
would be very low.
72
However, federalism is the most serious barrier to China's ability to
cope with the environmental consequences of power development in the
short term. As a consequence of economic reform in the past decade and
a half and as a precondition of further reform, the Chinese government
has had to yield power to interest groups at the provincial level. Now,
however, the central government finds it difficult to rein in increasingly
independent provinces which have been invigorated with economic
success and political clout. 73 According to one commentator, the "central
authority is proving no match for the lure of get-rich-quick opportunities
in burgeoning local economies., 74 This decentralization has allowed
local and regional leaders, particularly in Special Economic Zones
(SEZs), 75 to loosen environmental standards in the race for economic
67. Ross, supra note 37, at 31.
68. Id.
69. See Profaizer, supra note 30, at 353. Though a few state-run enterprises have been
closed due to pollution, these actions are rare. Id.
70. Potier, supra note 48, at 20. Fees represent only a tiny fraction (about 0.1%) of
production costs and are not pegged to inflation. let
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Lincoln Kaye, The Grip Slips, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 11, 1995, at 18, 19.
74. ld. at 18.
75. SEZs are designated socialist laboratories for experimenting with free-market principles
and encouraging foreign investment. They have been the site of the some of the most rapid and
dynamic economic development in the world. See GEORGE T. CRANE, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF CHINA'S SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES (1990).
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modernization. 76 Indeed, certain provisions of the Environmental Protec-
tion Law require the approval of local governments before the environ-
mental protection authorities can act.77
As a result of decentralization, localities frequently disregard the
strict environmental guidelines promulgated by the central authorities.
When fines are levied, local leaders admit that the payment of fines and
the time allowed for settlement is subject to negotiation, if not outright
bribery, particularly when the polluter has connections in the collection
office. 78 For instance, because fines are a main source of regulators'
revenues, local environmental officers are reluctant to force all polluters
into compliance. 79 Decentralization also means that as the central gov-
ernment's fiscal base dwindles and regional government coffers swell,
Beijing increasingly lacks the financial capability to exert macroeconom-
ic controls such as price liberalization.8" China's aggressive drive for
rapid economic growth and the regional disparities in wealth it has
created has exacerbated the federalism problem which exists between the
center and the provinces. It is an issue likely to linger and frustrate
enforcement of environmental regulations in the near future.
Finally, a notable consideration with respect to enforcement
is that
[iun a culture in which the role of law and lawyers has undergone
such radical change in the past 15 years, in which a tradition of
'rule by person' is only slowly yielding to 'rule of law,' and in
which 'the government monopolizes all the choices' in environ-
mental management, Western models of legal enforcement do not
fit in well.81
In light of the deep historical differences between Chinese and Western
notions of enforcement, regulatory compliance in the Western sense will
only develop as quickly as the Chinese public adapts to respect a
76. Profaizer, supra note 30, at 336, 341. Decentralization also reduces the likelihood of
resource diversion to produce more efficient boilers for heat, steam, or electrical generation.
Coal Equals Growth, supra note 25, at A8. Nonetheless, some Chinese areas took action to
limit pollution emissions. See, e.g., Brauchli, supra note 1, at A3 (discussing Shanghai's
shutdown of ten factories in 1993).
77. Ross, supra note 37, at 31 (discussing Articles 12 and 39 of the Environmental
Protection Law of the P.R.C. (1984)).
78. Potier, supra note 48, at 21.
79. Brauchli, supra note 1, at A3.
80. Kaye, supra note 73, at 19. Even many provincial functionaries refused promotions
to Beijing, such that they can stay local and profit from informal political influence. Id.
81. Chun-Xi et al., supra note 24, at 180-81 (footnotes omitted).
1028 [Vol. 17:1015
Power Development in China
developing legal and regulatory framework. Nonetheless, the severity of
environmental degradation in China juxtaposed against a set of seeming-
ly strict statutory prohibitions on pollution suggests that enforcement is
ineffective by any measure.
C. Improving Efficiency and Liberalizing Prices
In light of the wasteful energy consumption of China's industrial
infrastructure, regulations mandating efficiency improvements possess
the potential for reducing massive amounts of pollution generated by the
power sector.8 2 However, commentators have disagreed on the marginal
returns of such regulations relative to the numerous other regulatory
measures available to the Chinese government.83 Nevertheless, all agree
that artificial restraints on fuel pricing remove competitive forces that
would encourage energy efficiency and conservation, as well as discour-
age waste.84 As a result, Chinese authorities are seeking to promote
energy price reforms in the next few years. 5
In reality, however, China's price-liberalization efforts will necessar-
ily be gradual in order to avoid political instability that might arise from
inflationary pressures.86 Millions of China's residential users will not be
able to afford rapid price liberalization unless they reduce their already-
low levels of consumption. Yet, it is counterintuitive for citizens of a
country that ranks about eightieth in the world in per capita kilowatt-
hours87 to reduce energy use for the sake of expanding the power sector.
82. See, e.g., Dadi, supra note 19, at 230 (detailing benefits from energy efficiency
improvements in China). Chinese State Environmental Commission Chair Song Jian previous-
ly stated that the government has been working to improve energy efficiency for the past
thirteen years and now has a target of saving three percent of energy production annually.
Controlling China's Greenhouse Emissions: What's Happening?, GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE
REP., Apr. 22, 1994. At that time, China planned to reduce energy intensity 50% by the year
2000 and to increase primary energy by 50% during the same period, even though capital
resources are applied to new power plants over energy efficiency gains. Id.
83. See Coal Equals Growth, supra note 25, at A8 (citing U.N. energy specialist who
enthusiastically advocated the liberalization of energy prices as an effective means to promote
energy efficiency). But see Environmental Crisis, supra note 6, at 125 (expressing concern
that energy conservation efforts have been exhausted unless substantial investment can alter
the basic structure of China's energy production and create new innovations).
84. ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS, supra note 6, at 125. Fixed prices have also forced China's
huge coal-mining industry and most of China's gas operations to operate at constant losses
which must be subsidized by the state budget. Id.
85. Jessica Hamburger, Lighting the Way for Energy Savings, CHINA Bus. REV.,
Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 42, 43.
86. Id
87. David Schneider et al., Power Plays, CHINA Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 20, 20.
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D. Private Foreign Investment
Some commentators argue that the most important sources of indus-
trial efficiency gains will be derived from modernizing industrial plants
and equipment.00 Foreign investors are instrumental in affecting this
process, which will ultimately determine the environmental consequenc-
es of China's power development. In the power sector, foreign technolo-
gy and capital can assist in developing alternative energy sources,
pollution control infrastructures, and environmental cleanup programs.
Likewise, in the industrial sector, more advanced and efficient energy-
consuming equipment will need to come from abroad.
1. Investment Opportunities
China's electric power sector has attracted much interest amongst
foreign power companies, especially the thermal power equipment
market.89 At least thirty percent of China's power generation equipment
will need to be imported.90 Further, while officials estimate that Chinese
banks and government agencies can finance seventy percent of the total
power requirement, the remaining thirty percent, about $45 billion, must
be supplied from foreign sources.9'
Private banks are one such source. According to Kyoichi Shimazaki,
a senior officer at the World Bank's co-financing department, "[p]rivate
banks can be an important source of funding for development projects in
several ways ... [c]ommercial sector investors and lenders are familiar
with such projects in the developing world." 92 In one case, under the
88. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS, supra note 6, at 124-25 (discussing Professor
Smil's observations about the replacement of facilities); Benjamin supra note 44, at 4A
(describing World Bank's perspective on China's outmoded technology).
89. David Schneider et al., On your Mark .... CHINA Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at
34, 35 (describing China's energy expansion plans and their impact on competition). Power
generation is currently one of the three infrastructure development areas targeted by the U.S.
Department of Commerce. INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF CoM., BIG EMERGING
MARKETS AT A GLANCE 1 (1994). The other two areas are telecommunications and transporta-
tion sectors. Id.
90. Schneider et al., supra note 89, at 34. Enormous markets exist for environmental
cleanup technology. According to California Lieutenant Governor Leo McCarthy, "No country
needs environmental technology as badly as China." Brauchli, supra note 1, at Al. Thomas
G. Smith, head of Asian operations for a global U.S. waste concern, Waste Management Inc.,
says that "[t]here could be big opportunities" in environmental cleanup. Id. The environmental
cleanup technology market is currently expanding in Hong Kong and Taiwan. See INT'L
TRADE ADMIN., supra note 89.
91. China's Power Needs, supra note 31, at B19.
92. Land, supra note 26, at 16.
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auspices of the World Bank's Expanded Co-financing Operation
(ECO),93 a group of commercial banks in Europe, the United States, and
Japan recently financed a Chinese energy scheme proposed by the
World Bank by raising $120 million to supplement a £350 million
World Bank loan for meeting the energy needs of the Jiangsu prov-
ince.94
In addition to the immense market for power-generating equipment,
new Chinese environmental regulations may generate profits for foreign
environmental firms. The Chinese government is considering the cre-
ation of new rules for power plant emission standards which would
require China's power industry to install scrubbers and other control
technologies.95 NEPA also may require costly new retrofit technology
for existing sources and for those which are expanding.96 For example,
some observers have estimated that China's purchases of clean-coal
technology will total $30 billion over the next few years. 97
2. Hurdles
In order to encourage foreign investment and lending, the central
government supports new power plant ownership schemes and decentral-
ization of the power sector.9 Nonetheless, a number of barriers currently
exist that are stalling new energy projects and discouraging overseas
investment in China's power sector. One of the causes is an "internal
debate over foreign profit margin [which] has pitted reform-minded
bureaucrats and province leaders hungry for electricity against central
planners who are distrustful of foreign ownership and suspicious of
financial arrangements that would provide competitive rates of return on
invested capital." 99 Moreover, an increasing sense of nationalism among
the Chinese has given the central planners the upper hand. As a result,
Beijing is no longer granting preferences which were once extended to
foreign investors in the 1980s.'00 The underlying assumption is that
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Ross, supra note 37, at 33.
96. Id.
97. Wilhelm, supra note 34, at El.
98. Schneider et al., supra note 89, at 37. Two forms of direct investment in construction
and operation of power plants are build-operate-transfer (BOT) where ownership is eventually
passed to local control and build-own-operate (BOO) where ownership is 100 percent foreign.
Id.
99. China's Power Needs, supra note 31, at B13.
100. Nayan Chanda & Kari Huus, The New Nationalism, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 9,
1995, at 20, 22.
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access to China's markets, workforce, and resources should be enough
to continue drawing foreign funds.'l ' While, in many respects, this is an
accurate assessment, broader attempts to limit foreign roles in the econo-
my and to protect so-called "pillar industries," such as the energy sector,
have "stalled approval of dozens of major refinery and power-generating
projects, setting China far behind in its need to produce more electrici-
ty."' 2 Further, a high inflation rate has increased Beijing's sensitivity to
higher rates of return and foreign exchange guarantees, both of which
equate to electricity tariff increases. 103 Fears of unemployment and
political unrest resulting from the revocation of electricity subsidies
from the industrial sector also temper the pace of economic reform
undertaken by the central government.
China has manifested its hesitation about foreign investment in a
number of ways. Recently, the government capped profit margins on
power projects at only fifteen to sixteen percent' 4 - well below the
eighteen or twenty percent found elsewhere in Asia.0 5 Additionally,
China's refusal to match electricity tariffs with inflation could mean a
declining rate of return for investors."° According to World Bank Presi-
dent Lewis Preston, China's power sector could risk losing significant
foreign investment to other Asian countries such as India, Indonesia,
Thailand and the Philippines if it sticks to its policy on return rates.107
Indeed, a number of investors have already diverted their investments
from China to other growing economies in Southeast Asia.'08
Another impediment to foreign firms is Beijing's refusal to provide
foreign exchange guarantees to counter the depreciation of the yuan.10 9
The limited convertibility of the Chinese currency provides the govern-
ment with central control over the country's entire economy by limiting
product exchange participants and the volumes to be traded. The lack of
a hard currency, however, inhibits profit repatriation and equipment
101. Id. at 23.
102. Id.
103. Renee Lai, China Must Clarify Rules On Power Deals, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Oct. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, SChina File. In big cities, inflation tripled
to an annual rate of approximately twenty percent in the first half of 1993. GEOFFREY
MURRAY, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA THE LAST GREAT MARKET 13 (1994).
104. Craig S. Smith, China Seeks Foreign Support to Generate More Power, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 16, 1995, at B4.
105. China's Power Needs, supra note 31, at B19.
106. Smith, supra note 104, at B4.
107. Lai, supra note 103.
108. See China's Power Needs, supra note 31, at B13, B19; Lai, supra note 103.
109. Lai, supra note 103.
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purchases."' Currently, builders of power projects must spend foreign
currency to import equipment, yet they earn local currency when they
sell their power. Without official guarantees from the central govern-
ment for debts owed by provinces, would-be lenders worry that develop-
ers will not have enough foreign currency to repay the project finance
debts. Moreover, according to one investor, "If the government cannot
give the [foreign exchange] guarantee, whatever rate of return it pro-
vides is useless when the yuan falls.'
Besides profit margin, an additional concern for investors is the lack
of a legal regime governing investments in the power sector."' The
problem is exacerbated by constantly changing investment guidelines
issued by a skittish central government." 3 Currently, each project fi-
nance agreement is essentially ad hoc, though contractually binding. "'
Even with a contract, however, investors often find that their agreements
are remarkably fluid. At a recent project finance conference, for exam-
ple, Standard & Poor's alleged that state-owned enterprises or branches
of government breached several contracts.''
5
Nonetheless, a body of law regulating the power sector is slowly
emerging. Successive contract negotiations provide precedents for both
future legislative codification" 6 and models for future power plant deals.
One important development in this regard is a project initiated by the
Asian Development Bank that will enhance the development of project-
finance law in China. Led by a U.S. consulting firm and a U.S. law
firm, the project introduces international project-finance techniques and
advice on the legal structure of the entity for a new power project in
110. Schneider et al., supra note 89, at 38. Foreign companies have developed alterna-
tives to generate a flow of foreign exchange. However, each method has complicating factors
implicit in the absence of a convertible currency in China. Id. at 38-41. The lack of available
funds from the central government also requires environmental companies to provide foreign
funding up-front in order to secure such deals. Brauchli, supra note 1, at Al.
111. Lai, supra note 103 (quoting managing director of CEA Asia, a subsidiary of a
major American utility company).
112. Schneider et al., supra note 89, at 41.
113. Smith, supra note 104, at B4.
114. Schneider et al., supra note 89, at 41.
115. Erik Guyot, Contract Disputes Imperil China's Bid to Raise Foreign Capital, S&P
Warns, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 1994, at A10. Guanxi - business relationships and long-term
trust - still often carries more weight than a well-negotiated agreement. According to one
investor, "The rule of contract law does not apply so heavily in China, so if you haven't
picked the right partner who's naturally motivated to the success of the operation, it won't
work." Gord McLaughlin, Chinese Proverb: Woe to He Who Tries to Court the Dragon in its
Own Lair, FIN. POST, Feb. 4, 1995, at 16.
116. McLaughlin, supra note 115, at 16.
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Shanghai." 7 This undertaking is part of a broader effort to provide for
the possibility of competitive bidding for Chinese power projects instead
of one-on-one negotiations. Some private company officials believe that
the project "will be a blueprint for future power projects in China."
' 8
After numerous stalled plans, the Chinese central government has
also responded to the need for laws to govern project finance in the
power sector. China recently enacted a power law designed to guarantee
the rights and interests of power industry investors. Despite some ambi-
guity, the law codifies existing practice and "represents a further move
toward creating an industry that operates according to law and not
political clout." 119
The systemic constraints described above - low rates of return,
lack of foreign exchange guarantees, and inadequate legal protections -
have deterred foreign capital from the power sector."2 While slower
energy development and the interrelated nature of environmental degra-
dation, economic growth, and power development provide both positive
and negative consequences, low levels of foreign investment will worsen
the environmental problem in the long run. Without proper incentives
for foreign investment, China will continue to rely on coal and outdated
technology. As a result, power plants will continue to emit
disproportionately large quantities of pollution relative to developed
countries without replacing old plants with new technologies. Further-
more, without power development, China's economy will not be able to
generate the wealth necessary to deal with current environmental prob-
lems. While postponed development will also mean fewer new sources
of pollution, the costs will quickly outweigh the benefits as polluting
technologies remain in operation, alternative energy sources left unused,
environmental controls not installed, and low government revenues,
caused by an energy shortage, remain.
3. The Influence of Foreign Investors
China has never shied from using its pollution as a bargaining chip
at the negotiating table. By dangling the carrot of market access before
would-be foreign investors, China has secured environmental assistance
117. Move to Competitive Bids for China Power Projects, POWER ASIA, May 15, 1995,
available in LEXIS, World News Library, Curnws File.
118. Id.
119. ChinalPower Law: Toward Greater Mkt Standardization, Jan. 8, 1996, available in
WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Library, Dow Jones Int'l News File. The law, however, allocated
most of the decision making power to local authorities. Id Federalism issues could, thus,
muddle enforcement. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
120. Smith, supra note 104, at B4.
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as part of overall foreign investment packages. Recently, an American
environmental consultant commented on plans for 100 Chinese
chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) plants:
The Chinese said they were willing to change their plans if the
West or companies like DuPont made the new technology available
to them, free of charge, of course. DuPont balked and the Chinese
said they would go ahead with the CFC plants, though I suspect in
the end the West will cave in and Beijing will get largely what it
wants.12
Foreign firms enhance ecological awareness in China by their mere
presence. According to Martin D. McMillian, managing director of a
U.K. environmental company in Hong Kong, "[miultinationals are more
interested in projecting a green image, especially in China."' 22 Environ-
mentally sound Western practices are setting an example. William E.
O'Brien of H.B. Fuller Co., a U.S. adhesives company, commented that
"our Chinese competitors thought we were crazy" for putting in water-
treatment equipment. 23 Accustomed to using and dumping water un-
treated, Chinese companies are now starting to follow the example set
by Fuller, Coca-Cola Co., PepsiCo Inc., and others in installing the
latest equipment - in part to avoid penalties.12
III. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
Even as Chinese leaders scramble to deal with their country's grow-
ing problem, the sheer magnitude of China's environmental woes makes
international cooperation indispensable to solving China's and the
world's looming environmental crisis. With the potential for creating
serious international environmental problems, which may also become
disruptive politically, China's pollutive emissions are inescapably mat-
ters of international concern. The international community can play an
121. Schmetzer, supra note 25, at 25.
122. Brauchli, supra note 1, at A8. In response to foreign concern about China's
environmental problems, China has sought foreign expertise to help manage the problem. For
example, the president of a private U.S. group, the China Environment Fund, was recently
appointed as an agent to raise money for environmental projects in a heavily polluted
industrial city in northern China. Id. In addition, the U.S. Senate's Energy and Natural
Resources Committee is considering whether U.S. companies should be allowed to offset
pollution limits imposed on their U.S. operations with reductions in greenhouse gases
achieved in China. Id. One committee staffer commented that a "billion dollars spent in the
U.S. on equipment or technology would get you only a fraction of the progress you'd get
with $1 billion in a country like China." Id. This credit arrangement is currently permitted for
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instrumental roles in controlling the environmental consequences of
China's energy development. States and nongovernmental organiza-
tions 12 can exert pressure on China to implement more environmentally
protective measures at a time when China needs foreign goodwill to
maintain its export boom and its application for membership in the
World Trade Organization. In addition, foreign sources of capital, such
as development banks and developed countries, are able to indirectly
influence China's environmental agenda through trade and financing.
A. Global Warming
The threat of global warming is the primary impetus for internation-
al cooperation on the environment. A recent assessment by a group of
2,500 scientists in the United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change found that the earth has entered a period of climatic
change resulting from emissions of heat-trapping "greenhouse" gases
such as carbon dioxide (CO 2). 26 Some scientists predict major shifts in
the regional magnitude and distribution of precipitation, increased hu-
man health risks, and sea-level rises. 127 In this context, according to
Vaclav Smil:
China's predicament - with absolute annual population increases
running well over ten million for the next generation, with its
average per capita energy consumption still only a half of the
minimum for good quality of life, and with its heavy reliance on
coal - would be especially unenviable. The worst-case scenario
would see an unmistakable onset of relatively rapid warming dur-
ing the 1990s translating into substantial CO2 generation cuts in
rich countries, with China becoming the leading producer of the
125. See generally Patricia Waak, Shaping a Sustainable Planet: The Role of Nongovern-
mental Organizations, 6 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 345 (1995).
126. William K. Stevens, Scientists Say Earth's Warming Could Set Off Wide Disrup-
tions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1995, at Al. Carbon dioxide is "essentially transparent to the
incoming, short-wave solar radiation while being a vigorous absorber of the outgoing, long-
wave terrestrial radiation, which it then emits both to space and back to the surface." ENvi-
RONMENTAL CRISIS, supra note 6, at 129.
127. ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS, supra note 6, at 131-33. Scientists disagree about the
consequences of global warming. For instance, while some experts believe that beneficial
effects will result from global warming, such as a roughly 30 percent higher crop productivity
and boosted water use efficiency of all plants, other experts predict declining crop yields due
to a gradual parching of soil in many regions of the world. Id. at 133; see also John Harte
and Daniel Laschof, Bad Weather? Just Wait, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1996, at A15. Nonethe-
less, recent evidence suggests that global warming and its effects are emerging for the first
time, and an increasing number of climatologists assert that part of the climatic changes
experienced is attributable to human activity. Stevens, supra note 126, at Al.
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gas before the year 2010, and finding itself under a mounting
international pressure to start cutting its emissions.12
Indeed, CO2 emissions may have particularly catastrophic environ-
mental consequences on the Chinese mainland. According to researchers
at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, global warming could cause a one-
meter rise in the sea level during the next thirty to fifty years which,
when magnified by storm tides, would flood an area the size of Portugal
along China's coastal plain.' 29 The flooded region would include agri-
cultural land vital to feed a projected 1.6 billion Chinese in thirty years
as well as the important manufacturing centers at Shanghai and
Guangzhou; 67 million people would be forced to abandon their land
and homes.1
30
B. Who is to Pay?
The question of environmental protection in China ultimately de-
pends upon the availability of massive amounts of capital investment.
China's leaders are already faced with the need to develop transportation
and telecommunications infrastructures, to modernize the industries
necessary to compete for export markets with the developed world, and
to provide the economic growth expected by China's expanding popula-
tion.' 3' Among these demands, energy development is the top priority
and primary recipient of industrial capital in China. 132 However, between
1991 and 1995, China's expenditures on the environment amounted to
only 0.7 of its gross domestic product.133 China's current plans and
budgeted expenditures for power development and pollution abatement
134
128. ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS, supra note 6, at 135. China's share of the global output of
CO2 in 1989 was 11%. Id. at 130. Only the former Soviet Union and the United States emit
more. Id.
129. Coal Equals Growth, supra note 25, at A8.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Wilhelm, supra note 34, at El.
133. Brauchli, supra note 1, at A8.
134. Despite fiscal constraints, the environment has been increasingly factored into the
central government's budget. For instance, in 1994, China announced that it had earmarked
$23 billion for environmental programs for the next six years. News Briefs: China, WORLD
ENv'T REP., July 20, 1994, at 127, 135. Though the money was earmarked for environmental
programs generally, air and industrial pollution are major environmental concerns in China.
I41 Indeed, China has formulated several ambitious alternative energy plans aimed at curbing
the environmental excesses of power development. In October 1994, China unveiled a 14-year
plan intended to develop renewable energy sources such as wind, solar thermal, geothermal,
and hydroelectric power to reduce its consumption of coal, oil, and natural gas. Renewable
Energy Development Accelerates in China, GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE REP., Oct. 28, 1994.
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have worldwide significance because as China vies for the unenviable
position of becoming the world's leading producer of greenhouse gases
in the next century, any changes on its domestic front will invariably
impact the global environment. The success of these efforts will, howev-
er, depend ultimately on foreign capital and technology - an issue
upon which the developed and developing worlds sharply disagree.
Chinese officials view international pressure to curb the environmen-
tal harm that comes with development as hypocritical and instead view
the issue as a question of equity. 3 While Europe and the United States
fueled their industrializations by exploiting their resources and polluting
the global environment, the argument goes, these same countries now
seek to disallow developing countries from following the same course. It
is in the context of China's view of its right to rapid development that
the sensitive issue of who should pay for China's environmental degra-
dation evokes a nationalistic response from China's leadership.
136
Lin Zongtang, vice-chairman of the environmental protection com-
mittee of the National People's Congress, argues that because the devel-
oped countries produce about 80 percent of the world's pollution, they
should be responsible for correcting the corresponding environmental
problems. 37 However, according to Timothy E. Wirth, the U.S. State
Department's Undersecretary for Global Affairs: "China has not recog-
nized that they are going to have increasing obligations for the future.
We may have fouled the atmosphere in the past, and that's our responsi-
bility. But we both are fouling the atmosphere for the future and that is
both of our responsibilities.' 38
Two important considerations should underlie the diplomatic wran-
gling over who should pay for the environmental consequences of power
The government is encouraging oil development by overhauling its system of refineries.
Haijiang Wang, Government Will Shape China's Refining Boom, OIL & GAS J., May 8, 1995,
at 42, 42. In addition, there are plans to build up to eight new nuclear power plants in the
next decade. China Eyes Energy Improvements, Including More Nuclear Power, WORLD
ENV'T REP., Aug. 6, 1993, at 125. However, as one commentator points out, "[n]uclear
power... is estimated to cost four times as much as coal-generated power." Wilhelm, supra
note 34, at El.
Perhaps the largest, and most controversial alternative resource development is the Three
Gorges Dam project which the government approved in April 1992. See generally, From
Great Wall to Three Gorges, 126 ENERGY ECONOMIST 6 (1992). It is estimated to cost $100
billion and to increase China's electrical output by ten percent with "clean" hydropower.
Patrick E. Tyler, Cracks Show Early in China's Big Dam Project, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1996,
at Al; Wilhelm, supra note 34, at El.
135. Coal Equals Growth, supra note 25, at A8.
136. Id.; see also Chanda & Huus, supra note 100, at 20 (describing a "rising tide" of
nationalistic pride in China today).
137. Coal Equals Growth, supra note 25, at A8.
138. lid.
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development in China. The first consideration demonstrates that primary
responsibility for China's environmental problems must lie with Beijing,
not the developed world. The second point explains why developed
countries - particularly the United States - ought to temper their
pressures in light of their own pollutive excesses.
1. Pressures on Beijing from Within and Without
The harms from the pollution generated by power development will
clearly be felt most heavily within Chinese borders. Better communica-
tions have informed more Chinese that industrial pollution is causing
health hazards, though a true environmental contingency has not yet
emerged.'39 This rising awareness at home will increase pressures on
Beijing to allocate more funding to environmental matters. Additional
pressure will also be felt from nearby countries, such as Japan and
South Korea, which are beginning to experience transboundary pollution
problems such as acid rain. Significant and concerted international
action with respect to power development in China will, however, take
longer to mobilize due to the latency of greenhouse effects. Indeed,
global warming is still a disputed theory in many scientific circles and
more tangible effects must be felt around the world before governments
of developed countries will be able to muster the political support neces-
sary to contribute significant amounts of aid to developing countries -
particularly when another country's environmental degradation requires
consumption changes at home."4 Thus, China must take the lead with
respect to the environmental consequences of its own development by
devoting more attention and resources to ecological concerns. Although
improving the global environment will require concerted international
cooperation in reducing wasteful energy, consumption, consumers in
developed countries are not likely to acquiesce to substantial cuts in
their living standards while high population growth continues in Chi-
na.' 4' China, for its part, will also have to commit itself to reducing
greenhouse gas output and its population growth.
2. Equitable Levels of International Pressure
Ethical considerations should dictate the level of pressure placed on
China to reduce its wasteful energy consumption through conservation.
139. Uli Schmetzer, Nature Second in China's Hearts: Activist Raising Green Aware-
ness, CHI TwB., Feb. 5, 1996, at 7.
140. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL CISIS, supra note 6, at 129-37.
141. Id at 136-37. Though China will produce the largest annual additions to population
during the next generation in absolute terms, its population growth rates are moderate
compared to Africa and Latin America. Id. at 136.
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China ranks only 80th in per capita energy consumption in the world
and 120 million rural residents are without adequate power.' 42 China
will not, on its own, be able to maintain the present output of CO2 while
supplying energy to a population increase of 250 million people during
the next generation. 143 Industrialized countries must bear this fact in
mind as well as their own environmental track records as they pressure
China to curb its environmental excesses. According to one commenta-
tor:
Rich industrial societies, with their slowly growing or virtually
stabilized population and huge amounts of energy consumed above
any liberal definition of good quality of life, could naturally re-
spond with much less painful consequences than the poor nations,
with large population increases and the need for further substantial
growth of primary energy consumption.'"
The United States and other rich nations signed to a treaty to cut
CO2 emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 at the Rio Summit in
1992.14 While Britain, Denmark the Netherlands, and Switzerland
expect to attain the goal, the United States - a country with much more
excessive per capita energy consumption than China - is falling short
of its treaty obligation to reduce global warming gases. 146 The United
States, the world's leading emitter of carbon dioxide, has certainly set a
poor example for developing countries such as China who are not yet
bound by such agreements.
According to Deng Nan, vice-minister of the State Science and
Technology Commission, China's environmental problems can only be
solved when technological and economic development grows to the
level where China can secure the efficient material, technological, and
financial support for environmental protection. 47 The China Daily notes
142. China Eyes Energy Improvements, Including More Nuclear Power, supra note 134,
at 125.
143. ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS, supra note 6, at 136.
144. Id. at 135; see also Brian B.A. McAllister, Note, The United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development: An Opportunity to Forge a New Unity in the Work of the
World Bank Among Human Rights, the Environment, and Sustainable Development, 16
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 689, 696-97 (1993) (arguing that progress in slowing
global environmental degradation requires large amounts of foreign aid in the form of capital
and technology transfers from the industrialized world).
145. William K. Stevens, Trying to Stem Emissions, U.S. Sees its Goal Fading, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 1995, at Al.
146. Id. at B8. The Clinton Administration has promised more proactive steps to curb
CO2 emissions if the shortfall continues. Id.
147. He Jun, China Seeks Sustainable Growth Strategy, CHINA DAILY, July 7, 1994,
available in 1994 WL 10759701.
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that while the United States and Japan launched their national cam-
paigns against environmental degradation after their per capita gross
domestic products (GDP) had reached $11,000 and $4,400, respectively,
China's per capita GDP in 1993 was only $470.148 Some observers
believe that higher living standards will increase environmental con-
sciousness and motivate voluntary clean-up efforts.
49
C. International Agreements
China's participation in the realm of international environmental
diplomacy has expanded alongside the increasing recognition of and
attempts to remedy environmental problems within its own borders. A
Chinese delegation attended both the 1972 United Nations Conference
on Human Environment (Stockholm Conference) and the 1987 Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,"' ° and China has
acceded to a number of environmental treaties. 5' Due to China's mas-
sive output, the country will have to be a prominent party to any effec-
tive international understanding.'52 Chinese Premier Li Peng's attendance
at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) in 1992, demonstrates China's interest in engaging the global
community with respect to such diplomacy. 1 3 Speeches made by Li
Peng and other Chinese delegates reveal China's stance - represen-
tative of developing countries' stances - on international environmental
issues. 54 China seeks both autonomy to determine its own pace for eco-
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Though China refused to sign either treaty at the time of their drafting, it has since
acceded to the Montreal Protocol (1991). Cai Shouqiu & Mark Voigts, The Development of
China's Environmental Diplomacy, 3 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. S-17, S-24-25 (1993); Ross,
supra note 37, at 32 (discussing economic benefits of compliance with international environ-
mental efforts).
151. These include the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
(in 1981), the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (in 1991), the
Basal Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
their Disposal (in 1991), the 1975 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance as
Waterfowl Habitat (in 1992), the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (in
1993), and the 1992 UN Convention on Biological Diversity (in 1993). Ross, supra note 37,
at 32.
152. ENVIRONMENTAL CRIsis, supra note 6, at 135.
153. Shouqiu & Voigts, supra note 150, at S-17 (describing UNCED where Chinese
Premier Li Peng presented proposals about global environmental concerns); see also Wirth,
supra note 3, at 604 (commenting about the participation of over 170 nations and at the
UNCED conference).
154. In June 1991, prior to the UNCED conference, the Chinese government sponsored
a conference entitled "The Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development of
Developing Countries." Shouqiu & Voigts supra note 150, at S-25. The approximately 200
attendees, including representatives from 41 developing countries, 10 international organiza-
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nomic growth and aid from developed nations to impede the environ-
mental degradation that comes with modernization.'
The tenuous middle road China seeks to tread between international
cooperation and national sovereignty is not guided, in any event, by a
strong sense of international cooperation in the aftermath of UNCED.
The primary product of the UNCED conference was the Rio Declara-
tion, "a charter of general principles, and Agenda 21 - UNCED's 800-
page action plan for governments during the next century."'' 5 6 According
to one commentator, "the long-term significance of a nonbinding,
aspirational statement of purpose such as the Rio Declaration, the con-
tent of which may be responsive to immediate political and policy
imperatives, cannot be predicted with certainty."'5 7 Indeed, there was no
consensus about the immediate impact of UNCED, and there has been
little systematic activity since its adoption. 5 8 China has, in fact, obtained
more international support on the bilateral front. For example, Japan's
MITI has formulated a Green Aid Plan for China;' 59 Canada and Austra-
lia have lent money for water-treatment facilities; and the European
Union is funding a study of water pollution.16° Together, these offers of
tions and nine developed countries, passed the "Beijing Declaration." Id. at S-25-26. Nitin
Desai, UNCED deputy secretary general, stated that the Beijing Declaration "crystallizes the
views of developing countries on the UNCED conference." id. at S-26.
155. Cai Shouqiu, Director of the Environmental Law Institute under NEPA, summarized
China's position with regard to economic development versus environmental protection that
"[o]nly with sufficient economic growth and the foundation of a new international economic
order can the developing world find appropriate ways to cope with environmental problems."
Id. at S-32.
With regard.to allocating the costs of environmental protection, Shouqiu stated that
"although China acknowledges its own responsibility to help solve the problems of
pollution, it believes that developed countries should bear the majority of the
financial burden of cleaning up the global environment."
Id. at S-33-34.
156. McAllister, supra note 144, at 694.
157. Wirth, supra note 3, at 649.
158. Id. at 650-51. The difficulty in shaping a broad multilateral effort to combat global
warming is exacerbated by the fact that current pollution (especially on a global scale) tends
to have latent manifestations of years or even decades. Thus, current pollution is unlikely to
affect the approval ratings of government officials since pollutive effects are not felt by
constituents until many years later - frequently, after an official is no longer in office. The
barriers to grappling with and achieving consensus on a global scale further dilute the sense
of urgency with which global wanning is currently addressed.
159. Peter Evans, Japan's Green Aid, CHINA Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1994, at 39, 40.
160. Brauchli, supra note 1, at Al. Notwithstanding a 1989 law enacted in response to
the Tienanmen Square incident that prohibits the U.S. government from directly supporting
environmental programs in China, the U.S. Congress is currently considering various regula-
tions that would be designed to encourage U.S. companies to assist in Chinese cleanup
efforts. Id.
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loans, technical assistance, and equipment from Japan, Europe, Canada,
and Australia amount to hundreds of millions of dollars.
161
D. Development Banks
Despite the lack of cooperation in the aftermath of UNCED, the
development banks, particularly the World Bank, are existing multilat-
eral institutions already working to advance the goals of the Rio Decla-
ration.162 Given the many risks implicit in Chinese power development
projects, development bank co-financing is vital to attracting private
financing. 163 As a central source of funding for the developing world,
the World Bank potentially wields significant leverage in setting the
environmental policies surrounding the projects it funds. 164 As the larg-
est and oldest of the development banks, the World Bank also influences
policy changes in other multilateral international and regional develop-
ment banks such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB). 165 More
importantly, the World Bank's lending policies affect the environmental
policies of China. However, the sheer volume of capital needed to
combat China's environmental dilemma dwarfs the amount of World
Bank and ADB loans, thereby providing the organizations only a very
limited influence on China's overall power development policy relative
to the influence of private capital. Still, it is important to consider the
policies and overall effects of China's largest lenders.' 66
The World Bank factors environmental considerations into its lend-
ing decisions through such measures as "Operational Directive 4.01,"
which calls for an environmental assessment before development pro-
jects are undertaken. In implementing the directive, the Bank attempts to
ensure that the project country has the technological and financial capa-
bility to prepare the environmental assessment. 167 Despite its efforts to
161. Id.
162. Charles E. Di Leva, The World Bank and Environmental Law: A Post-Rio Summary of
Activities, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1994, at 525, 527 (ALI-ABA Study Materials, Feb. 1994).
163. Peter F. Fitzgerald, Money for Power, CHINA Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 30.
164. See generally Mark Milner, Bretton Woods at 50: Change Brings Money with
Strings Attached, GUARDIAN, July 19, 1994, at 15 (describing the leverage of another interna-
tional financial institution, the International Monetary Fund, in transition economies).
165. McAllister, supra note 144, at 702.
166. Angeline Oyog, IMF/World Bank - China: Undaunted by China's Overheated
Economy, INTER PRESS SERV., Oct. 6, 1994, available in 1994 WL 2715021.
167. Though the environmental assessments are supposed to involve affected groups and
nongovernmental organizations, the assessment is considered the property of the project
country's government, and the World Bank mandates neither popular participation nor the
release of information. R.J.A. Goodland, The World Bank's Environmental Assessment Policy,
14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 811, 814, 816 (1991).
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consider the enviionmental impact of projects, the World Bank does not
have an entirely "green" track record in the area of China's power
development. For example, environmental activists have criticized the
World Bank for continuing to finance the development of coal-fired
plants without first auditing the plant's CO2 emissions. 68 Further, the
World Bank often backs conflicting policies with its Global Environ-
ment Facility (GEF) - an organization developed during the Rio Sum-
mit to assist developing nations in financing projects that would have a
positive environmental effect.' 69 While the World Bank, through the
GEF, will provide $2 million to help reduce greenhouse gas emissions
in China, it is also proposing $480 million in loans for four coal-fired
power plants and $150 million for gas development without considering
the effects of greenhouse gas emissions.7 °
Notwithstanding certain environmentalists' critiques, development
banks appear to have at least stricken a balance between development
and environmental protection in their lending policies. By mid-1994, the
World Bank had supported nineteen energy projects in China.' Yet at
the same time, as of the end of 1993, China had received $1.1 billion in
World Bank and ADB loans for environmental protection initiatives.'72
The World Bank now channels as much as $500 million a year into
environmental programs in China.7 7 By 1994, the GEF, which makes
grants instead of loans, had received $2 billion in pledges from thirty
countries for environmental initiatives. '74 These pledges will help target
solar and renewable energy initiatives that assist developing nations in
severing their reliance on traditional fossil fuels such as coal.
75
Nonetheless, according to one commentator, "the World Bank, the
Asian Development Bank and other agencies now provide less than 5%
of the $40 billion or so that Asia as a whole is estimated to need each
year for environmental cleanup."'' 76 Thus, development banks serve more
168. Oyog, supra note 166. But see China Loans to Target Power Transport Projects,
WORLD BANK WATCH, July 13, 1992, at 4 (describing a commitment by the Asian Develop-
ment Bank to finance the first two 300 MW units of a planned 1,200-MW coal-fired plant
with a total cost of $360 million).
169. McAllister, supra note 144, at 721.
170. Id.
171. WBank Backs China Gas Plans With $255m Development Loan, POWER IN ASIA,
Apr. 18, 1994, at 16, 17. For instance, the World Bank made a $255 million loan to a natural
gas development project in Sichuan province in order to diversify China's energy base. Id.
172. Ross, supra note 37, at 32.
173. Brauchli, supra note 1, at Al.
174. News Briefs: GEF, WORLD ENV'T REP., July 20, 1994, at 127, 134.
175. Id.
176. Brauchli, supra note 1, at A8.
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as catalysts for cofinancing large-scale infrastructure projects than as
primary sources of the massive capital infusions necessary to combat
environmental degradation in China. Thus, private capital is still indis-
pensable to curb the damage from power development.
IV. PROPOSED ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL MEASURES
China's power shortages drive an aggressive expansion of the coun-
try's power output which, if generated from the same antiquated, ineffi-
cient technology, will make a desperate environmental situation consid-
erably more dangerous, both from the perspectives of public health and
global warming. The sheer immensity of China's energy-pollution
dilemma, driven by the needs of the largest population on earth, makes
it much more than a national or even a regional problem. This section
proposes a series of steps to be undertaken by China and the internation-
al community in confronting the issue.
A. China's Reforms
As China rapidly expands its power grid without paying significant
attention to the environmental repercussions, pollution and growth will
increasingly collide; according to one expert, "[t]his enormous economic
growth going on in China ... [is] going to run full speed into an envi-
ronmental wall of unsustainability.' 77 Not only does Beijing have an
ecological impetus for placing greater emphasis on environmental degra-
dation, there is an economic incentive as well.
1. Investment Reforms
In the short term, ecological gains can be realized through construc-
tive engagement with private international investors. China should
loosen its investment barriers to ensure the transfer of sound environ-
mental and energy-efficient technology as well as foreign capital. In this
way, new projects will not only generate power to develop China's
economy to the point where more comprehensive environmental man-
agement becomes feasible, they will simultaneously replace an antiquat-
ed, polluting infrastructure with cleaner plants. China should enhance
the investment climate for power infrastructure finance by reducing cer-
tain types of risk.
First, China must be willing to provide higher rates of return for
power projects. Though the costs will be passed on to Chinese
177. Id.
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consumers (raising the possibility of political unrest), higher rates of
return are possible if the central government carefully and continuously
implements its current plans to fully marketize energy prices. A second
important step would be to make the Chinese renmingbi fully convert-
ible on international currency markets. This will reduce the currency risk
implicit in power projects and allow China to overcome foreign
exchanges shortages for imported equipment. Third, the current steps
underway to create a legal regime for governing project finance deals17
are promising and should be encouraged and, where appropriate, institu-
tionalized by the central government.
China must continue to use its negotiating leverage, created by
intense competition in the power sector amongst foreign investors, to
insist upon advanced environmental controls as a condition of foreign
investment. While improving China's environmental management and
technology will add costs in the short run, it will also provide signifi-
cant economic and environmental benefits in the long run. Energy-effi-
cient technologies do not always impose higher costs, especially when
attributes such as better reliability, product quality, and environmental
controls are considered.
2. Reforming the Environmental Regime
China's current regulatory measures seem unlikely to be efficacious
in the short run due to the intrinsic limitations posed by institutional
deficiencies such as inadequate enforcement mechanisms and an under-
developed legal regime. 79 The pollution charge system, the central and
most promising component of China's environmental law, faces one of
China's most daunting challenges for the future - the federalism dilem-
mas posed by a weakened center coupled with increasingly powerful,
wealthy provinces emboldened to ignore Beijing's environmental dic-
tates and racing to realize economic growth at all costs. The magnitude
of institutional and political change which must accompany an effective
revamping of China's environmental law regime necessitates a long-term
approach to reform in this area.
Certain internal changes should nonetheless be started in the near
term to prepare China's domestic institutions to be responsive to intensi-
fying ecological stresses. Greater funding and staffing will enhance the
enforcement of an already relatively comprehensive set of environmental
regulations and contribute to the further development of a regulatory
178. See supra text accompanying notes 117-20.
179. See supra Part II.A.
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framework for environmental protection.' 80 Fees and fines should also be
gradually raised to begin to approximate the marginal cost of pollution
control (creating incentives for abatement) and to force China's power
industry to become increasingly accustomed to compliance with the rule
of law.
In the long run, China will need to continue its economic and indus-
trial reforms while encouraging price liberalization and concomitant in-
creases in energy efficiency. Further, there is a need for an institutional
and cultural setting that would induce Chinese citizens, as individual
environmental decisionmakers, to become more ecologically responsible
in their day-to-day lives. A China which is neither a capitalist market
economy nor a centrally planned socialist economy is one whose institu-
tions generate very mixed messages with regard to the environment. The
"get rich quick" mentality that currently characterizes much of the
economy and the corrupt uses of political power for economic gain
often encourage careless, exploitative behavior with regard to the envi-
ronment. On the other hand, the reformist movement toward prices that
reflect scarcity values should encourage greater environmental responsi-
bility. The development of project finance law will concurrently contrib-
ute to the development of a larger legal framework for governing envi-
ronmental disputes.
A final consideration in the context of China's ability to combat
environmental damage is the federalism problem whose resolution will
be driven by ongoing political struggles which loom much larger in
Beijing's priorities than the environment. Beijing must choose to struc-
ture its governance towards either accepting or opposing decentraliza-
tion. The former path will mean less control for the center and, perhaps,
less uniformity in China's response to environmental destruction. The
latter path, while possibly enhancing enforcement of environmental law
through greater central control, may likely bring economic and political
problems as well. The proper route to take in this area impinges on too
many other policies of the Chinese government to recommend that
China hinge its choice based on environmental protection alone.
B. International Efforts
Given the nature and extent of China's problems and the levels of
support that can be expected from the international community, interna-
tional cooperation will make a major difference in retarding degradation.
180. Projected environmental expenditures of $950 million between 1991 and 1995 were
inadequately low at less than 0.7% of China's gross domestic product. Brauchli, supra note 1,
at Al.
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The growing emphasis placed on the environment in China's relations
with international organizations such as the World Bank and foreign
governments, the pressures placed on China by nongovernmental organi-
zations, and the obligations China incurs by its participation in emerging
international environmental regimes all ensure that China's domestic
environmental technology and policy choices increasingly will be condi-
tioned by international influences.
Foreign governments, while playing an important role in pressuring
China on its environmental record, must also temper the pressure they
exert depending on the level of environmentally responsible energy
consumption exercised within their own borders. The per capita energy
consumption in the United States, for instance, far exceeds China's per
capita energy use.' A balance must be struck on the diplomatic front
which encourages the development of China's power infrastructure and
which at the same time holds China responsible for those environmental
obligations which it is financially and technologically able to meet. One
way in which developed countries can curb global warming is by hold-
ing investors from within their borders to a high standard of environ-
mental responsibility in overseas power projects in China. This creates
diplomatic goodwill and contributes to a cleaner global environment.
Naturally, such actions are dependent upon China's willingness to open
the door to its power sector.
International financial organizations such as the World Bank should
also continue to focus on the environmental implications of their loans
without allowing the goal of financing large projects to overshadow
environmental considerations - particularly given the extent and magni-
tude of aggravating factors in China such as population and economic
growth. The World Bank, like its member countries, should finance
environmentally responsible projects in China while sponsoring enough
power expansion to allow China's economy to expend greater resources
to the environmental issues. Finally, in the long run, as the developed
and developing nations continue the "sustainable development" debate
and norms begin to develop, further institutional development will be
necessary to monitor and settle disputes.
8 2
181. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
182. Ved P. Nanda, Trends in International Environmental Law, 20 CAL. W. INT'L L.J.
187, 193 (1989-1990). See generally Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Institutional Misfits: The GAiT, the
ICJ & Trade-Environment Disputes, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1043 (1994).
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CONCLUSION
The current attitude of China's leadership towards the sustainable
development dilemma can be summed up by a Chinese saying: "One
should not give up eating for fear of choking." Yet, the quality of life
that comes with the prosperity Chinese citizens have come to expect and
demand will be eroded by the dangerously unhealthy, smog-laden air in
which they and future generations will be forced to live. This Note
established the severity of China's pollution problem and the compound-
ing implications of power development for both China and the world.
This Note suggests that new foreign investment projects coupled
with adequate internal environmental controls present the most important
form of environmental protection and planning in the immediate future.
Using foreign technology and capital, however, requires that China
lower investment barriers and ensure that foreign investors develop new
projects and operate plants in environmentally responsible ways inside
China. In addition, the international community must continue to pro-
vide financial and technological aid to China and to pressure Beijing to
focus greater attention on environmental concerns. Power development
in the world's most populous country need not mean environmental
devastation.
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